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International law suffers both from 
its friends and its enemies. Its enemies 
include the geopoliticians, who hear 
nothing but the surge and crash of great 
international forces; the Kennanites, 
who rebel against a "legalistic" ap-
proach to international affairs; and the 
specialists in international relations, 
who, not knowing very much about the 
subject, lump international law, as con-
ceived by Hugo Grotius, with the 
League of Nations, the United Nations, 
and the control of the white slave trade. 
The similarity between some of the 
friends of international law and most of 
its enemies is that they overstate the 
pretended case for international law. It 
is then all too ea'sy to demonstrate that, 
despite the claims made for interna-
tional law, the world is still in a de-
plorable state. The truth lies somewhere 
between the contentions of those who 
find no place for international law in 
the savage world of interstate relations 
and those who believe that the millen-
ium can be achieved with a heavy 
infusion of international law and good 
will. What is the correct view must be 
left to each of you to determine at the 
end of this brief introductory course. 
It is quite clear that man has not 
been able to legislate war and aggression 
into defeat or even into retreat, al-
though the institutions which the inter-
national community has developed exer-
cise some restraints on the use of force. 
Customary law cannot cope adequately 
with the need for peaceful change. If a 
nation needs more territory or larger 
markets, the law cannot provide them. 
It cannot make an unhappy people 
happy; it cannot turn arid desert into a 
flowering paradise; it cannot bring inter-
national tranquility and understanding 
where discord reigned before. Indeed, it 
might be safe to say that international 
law has been most successful in dealing 
with minor matters and with the slighter 
causes of in terna tional friction. 
Probably it shows a greater facility in 
preserving the status quo than in doing 
justice. 
Within these severe limitations, inter-
national law does play an important 
part in minimizing possible sources of 
international friction and in making it 
possible for nations and their people to 
live together peacefully in an increas-
ingly crowded world. This is not to say 
that it is the only force making for these 
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conditions. Merchants do not perform 
their contracts only because the law 
grants a remedy against them if they do 
not The Uniform Code of Military 
Justice and the law of the State of 
Rhode Island are not the only restraints 
which keep you from resorting to physi-
cal violence against those you dislike or 
with whom you disagree. So also in the 
international sphere, enlightened self-
in terest, certain consideration of 
morality, the desire for stability, and 
the fear of retaliation work with the 
precepts of international law to main-
tain international order. Actually, it is 
impossible to separate international law 
from these other forces, for the law 
which governs the relationships of 
States has its origins in self-interest, 
morality, the quest for stability, and the 
fear of the consequences of conduct 
departing from international standards. 
International law-or the law of na-
tions, as it is sometimes called-per-
forms two major services. The first of 
these is to insure stability. The second is 
the creation of arrangements for future 
avoidance of conflict and dispute. 
I must speak first of the law's func-
tion in the preservation of stable inter-
national relationships, for this is the 
principal concern of the customary law 
which has grown up over the course of 
the centuries. One of the greatest legal 
thinkers of our age, Hans Kelsen, who 
served for a year as Professor of Interna-
tional Law here at the War College, has 
written a book on the "General Theory 
of Law and State." He speaks in page 
after page of a "basic norm" upon 
which all international law and all na-
tional legal systems depend. One waits 
anxiously for this key to the legal 
universe as one reads through several 
hundred pages of profound and not 
altogether easy prose. Finally, on page 
369, one ,finds the basic principle upon 
which all else depends-"The States 
ought to behave as they have custom-
arily behaved." At first reading this 
statement sounds didactic, unhelpful, 
perhaps even foolish. It is certainly 
anticlimatic. But a little thought will, I 
think, persuade you that this is a useful 
key to international law. But why, in a 
dynamic universe, should we behave as 
we have in the past? We do so because if 
we allow our conduct to fall into certain 
patterns, we avoid some of the clashes 
between States which would arise if 
each point of contact presented a fresh 
issue to be fought out. If persons having 
to pass through a farmer's field keep to 
the path and if the farmer refrains from 
planting his crops in that path, there 
will be scant possibility of any dispute 
between pedestrians and the farmer. If 
people constantly take different paths 
across the field and the farmer blocks 
off various paths, bad feelings and even 
violence can be anticipated. Other rea-
sons as well dictate that we should act 
within the legal limits which have grown 
up through force of custom in the past. 
If we react differently in different in-
stances of the same ·factual situation, 
our conduct becomes inconsistent and 
irrational. Plain laziness may be another 
reason why we should continue to act as 
we have acted before. If a contlict of 
interests in the past was solved only 
with much pain and difficulty, there is 
no reason why the battle should be 
refought each time the identical contlict 
of interest arises. 
This psychological explanation of 
why we find it expedient to conform to 
the pattern of rights and duties previ-
ously established leaves unanswered the 
question how these rights and duties 
arose in the first place. Some of them 
are based on principles of justice not 
unlike those underlying the laws of 
various countries. The responsibility a 
State has for the injury which one of its 
employees intlicts on an alien, for ex-
ample by taking his property without 
compensation, is a reflection of what 
most systems of law have considered to 
be just dealing over the course of the 
years. In other instances, the role of 
justice is somewhat less clear. There is 
no great principle of right dealing which 
calls for a territorial sea of three miles 
instead of two or four. Historically, the 
limit was more or less arbitrarily estab-
lished and was not even, as many people 
think it was, equivalent to the range of 
cannon in the eighteenth century. An 
international boundary is not, except in 
terms of politics, "just" or "unjust"; it 
simply is. The respect which the law 
demands for the distinction between 
what is mine and what is thine, how-
ever, can be said to reflect just dealing. 
A third area of international law is the 
result of the adoption of policies for the 
regulation of international intercourse. 
Of this nature are the immunities en-
joyed by diplomats and consuls. Justice 
might demand that if an ambassador 
were introducing narcotics into the 
Statc to which he was accredited in 
violation of its law, he should be prose-
cu ted in the courts of that State. But it 
is considered that the conduct of inter-
national relations wiII be facilitated by 
giving the ambassador complete free-
dom from suit. Any other rule might 
make it difficult for him to carry out his 
represcntative functions. 
I spoke several minutes ago of the 
second role of international law as being 
the framing of institutions and arrange-
ments which wiII permit nations, in 
their relations with other States, with 
international organizations, and with 
aliens, to avoid conflict and to create 
the conditions under which political and 
social and economic security can be 
achieved. It might be more correct to 
speak of this as a role of the interna-
tional lawyer, for this is essentially a 
creative function. Those charged with 
the making of a new law must also 
know what principles, rules, organiza-
tional forms and controls have worked 
in the past, for, as Santayana has re-
minded us, those who forget the past 
are condemned to relive it. This is no 
more than to say that the lawyer or 
layman who is drafting a treaty should 
have a grounding in customary intern a-
3 
tional law. Amongst the problems with 
which we wiII deal in seminars during 
the next ten days, you will recognize 
some problems which ask you to declar~ 
what the proper result would be under 
the existing law and others in which you 
are asked to think creatively about what 
should be the future of the law. 
In what I have to say about the 
origins and purposes of international 
law, I do not mean to underestimate the 
importance of international politics-of 
power politics. Statesmen and lawyers 
from the Latin American States not 
infrequently complain that the princi-
ples of responsibility for injuries to the 
persons and property of aliens which 
can be derived from the numerous cases 
decided by arbitral tribunals reflect the 
fact that marines and gunboats made it 
possible for the United States to force 
arbitration of these cases on terms 
favorable to the United States. The 
most recent example we have had of the 
way in which politics molds interna-
tional law was in the Geneva Conference 
on the Law of the Sea. As to each 
proposal made at the Conference, the 
question of each State was: How will 
this affect my political and economic 
interests? Saudi Arabia and Israel were 
worried about how the provisions on 
bays and on passage through straits 
would affect Aqaba and the Straits of 
Tiran. The CEP Powers-Chile, Ecuador, 
and Peru-were concerned with the 
maintenance of a 200-mile territorial 
sea. Iceland wondered how the fishing 
grounds of its coast would be affected. 
Panama wished to protect its position as 
a refuge for shipping seeking a mir.imum 
of regulation. Failure to agree on the 
breadth of the territorial sea, admittedly 
a most important matter, should not 
obscure the fact that, in spite of these 
political differences, some sound con-
ventions were hammered out. As you 
read these, I think you will be per-
suaded that they represent a sound and 
just balancing of interests and that 
they should and wiII be adopted by 
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a substantial number of States. 
A healthy political realism is use-
ful. It should not lead you to cyni-
cism. States do conform to interna-
tional law even though abiding by the 
law in a particular case may cost them 
money or be adverse to their interests. 
The record of compliance with the 
judgments of international tribunals is 
excellent. States do pay international 
claims arising out of violations of inter-
national law committed by their 
officials, members of their armed forces, 
and their employees. The United States, 
for example, has paid for the foreign 
vessels which it requisitioned, consis-
tently with international law, during the 
Second World War. Egypt has paid full 
compensation for the nationalization of 
the Suez Canal, as international law 
probably required it to do. Each time 
that a State acts in accordance with 
international law, it makes it easier for 
that State to demand conformity with 
international law by other States. 
The durability of law is attested by 
the fact that it survives even in time of 
war, when the belligerents have cast off 
those restraints which normally keep 
them at peace. There is virtually no law 
governing the conduct of hostilities 
themselves, but as we move further 
from the scene of battle and conditions 
become somewhat more stabilized the 
law increasingly becomes able to per-
form its humanitarian mission of pro- -
tecting the victims of war from unneces-
sary devastation and suffering. Even the 
total war of today does not require the 
extermination of the part of the civilian 
population that does not take part in 
hostilities; the wounded and sick, and 
prisoners of war, the protection of 
whom is not only compatible with the 
efficient conduct of hostilities but also 
is conducive to victory in the political 
struggle of which the use of force is 
only one aspect. A large part of the law 
of the sea is devoted to striking a 
balance between the demand of the 
belligerents to carry on their economic 
blockade and the need of the neutrals to 
maintain their trade. The important 
changes wrought in the law relating to 
contraband and blockade as the result 
of two World Wars will be considered in 
some detail in connection with the 
seminar problems on the economic 
blockade, which are designed to draw 
attention to the new developments in 
this field. Over and above these two 
functions of regulating the conduct of 
the belligerents toward the victims of 
war and neutral nations and their trade, 
the law of war, in dealing with such 
subjects as armistices and surrenders and 
negotiations between belligerents, pro-
vides procedures for bringing hostilities 
to a close short of total annihilation of 
one or both of the contending parties. I 
assume that those of you who may have 
some mental reservations about a battle 
fought between two scorpions in a 
bottle may not be unsympathetic to 
these purposes of the law of war. The 
law of war has been violated often, but, 
every instance in which it has been 
observed, it has brought about a mitiga-
tion of violence, often measurable in 
terms of human lives saved, and this 
without prejudice to the efficient con-
duct of war. 
To many, lawyers and nonlawyers 
alike, it seems incredible that a body of 
rules purporting to govern the conduct 
of nations but providing no sanctions or 
punishment for their violation should be 
called law at all. It is not altogether fair 
to speak of international law as a 
sanctionless body of law, for the great 
numbers of cases in which damages have 
been awarded and paid and in which 
individuals have been punished for 
criminal violations of the law of nations 
bear witness to the contrary. The single 
category of cases in which civil damages 
most commonly have been granted are 
those arising out of wrongs done by 
States to aliens. Criminal penalties, leav-
ing aside such exceptional offenses as 
piracy, have been reserved for violations 
of the law of war, which resemble the 
normal crimes punishable under na-
tional legal systems to such a degree 
that some countries even have tried war 
criminals under their ordinary penal 
codes. Yet a third type of satisfaction 
exists in international law-the apology 
or rendering of honors or other admis-
sion of violation of the law. One should 
not scoff at these symbolic acts. They 
constitute outward and visible signs of 
what should be the correct relationships 
between the parties and the proper 
principle of law to be applied in the 
future. 
But, you justifiably object, what 
force is there to compel a State to pay 
the damages which have been assessed 
against it, or to render up its nationals 
for trial by a foreign court, or to admit 
the impropriety or illegality of its con-
duct in a particular case? Admittedly, 
there is no international sheriff armed 
with power to see that judgments are 
enforced or that the parties appear 
before an international tribunal in the 
first place. But it is easy to overempha-
size the importance of the sanction. A 
superior court has no forceful means at 
its disposal to compel obedience to its 
mandate by a subordinate court. If a 
court directs a command to the execu-
tive which goes unheeded, what means 
has it of compelling that obedience? 
You may remember the words attri-
buted to President Jackson: "Well, John 
Marshall has made his decision, now let 
him enforce it!" A comparative statis-
tical analysis of the number of divisions 
available to the Pope and to the United 
States Supreme Court would not be 
difficult to make. And if a hillbilly 
called to high political office voices 
contempt for the law of the land and 
allows the mob to rule within his 
jurisdiction, can the sanction of employ-
ing loyal troops solve this prohlem of 
subversion? Sanctions, as we commonly 
think of them, seem to belong to the 
normal day-to-day enforcement of the 
law. The great edifice of our constitu-
tional system is held together not by the 
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fear of duress if the law he violated, but 
by a common devotion and loyalty to 
the law by those charged with its 
making and its application. 
Moreover, as I mentioned some 
minutes ago, it is not the law alone, in 
the form of a fear of crimil1al penalty or 
of civil damages, which secures compli-
ance with law. Morality, taboos, social 
pressure, the views of -the community, 
and religion are among the forces allied 
with the threat of penalty or damages in 
securing compliance with law. 
It thus would appear that the sanc-
tion behind the sanction in national law 
is the sense of the community that it 
should be governed by the rule of law. 
It is that basic sanction which is lacking 
very largely in the international sphere. 
It is not absent altogether, however, for, 
if it were, the world would,be in a state 
of anarchy. The extent of the convic-
tion in favor of subjection to law varies 
from country to country, from interna-
tional relationship to international rela-
tionship, from legal principle to legal 
principle, and from case to case. With 
many countries of the world, the United 
States has a vast network of agreements, 
which are carried out on a routine basis, 
although differences of views as to 
interpretation may arise from time to 
time. The United States can carry on 
discussions with Great Britain or France 
or Switzerland or Japan in terms of 
international law, and both parties can 
make themselves understood. We-and I 
speak here of a responsibility all 
Americans bear through our senators-
are, on the other hand, unwilling to 
concede to the International Court of 
Justice compulsory jurisdiction over dis-
putes with those States with which we 
have the closest affinities of law, tradi-
tion, interest, and security. In their 
public pronouncements, our principal 
ministers are dedicated fiercely to the 
rule of law and in steadfast opposition 
to international sin. In its actual con-
duct in particular cases, this country 
frequently shows itself as zealous to 
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preserve its sovereignty-which is a 
polite way of saying being a law unto 
itself-as other major powers. 
In the present state of international 
law, it is not surprising that the law 
should not be interpreted uniformly, 
even in theoretical terms, throughout 
the world. Legal rules sometimes exist 
on a regional basis. A clear example is 
the principle regarding political asylum 
in embassies which prevails in Latin 
America but only to a very limited 
extent elsewhere. More obvious to the 
eye is the peculiar nature of Soviet 
international law. This cannot be ex-
plained solely in terms of Marxist 
theory. The Soviet view of international 
law is without doubt a servant of the 
policy of the U.S.S.R., and, as such, it 
serves a most important defensive func-
tion. If you were to compare the inter-
national law of modern Russia with that 
which prevailed in the rest of the world 
in the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries, I think you would be 
struck by the similarity. Soviet interna-
tional law is strongly isolationist and 
places great emphasis on State sover-
eignty; that is, on freedom from inter-
ference by other States. This shield 
against legal controls permits the 
U.S.S.R. to carry out its policies 
through internal subversion and through 
political pressures, while international 
law is used to ward off legal attacks on 
the U.S.S.R. and the nation within 
which the subversion is being practiced. 
There are other aspects of Russia's 
attitude toward international law which 
stem from the history of Russia and 
would remain unchanged if the U.S.S.R. 
were to join the Free World tomorrow. 
For example, one of the cardinal princi-
ples of Soviet foreign policy has always 
been to maintain the Black Sea as a 
private swimming club, with outsiders 
barred at the Turkish Straits. If the 
Russians are difficult about this point, it 
is not the corrupting influence of Com-
munism which has made them so. 
This is not the time nor am I the 
person to speculate about the way in 
which the world may be made subject 
to the rule of law. Some suggest that the 
creation of a true world law, binding on 
all States and enforced against them, 
must await the creation of a world 
government. An important blueprint for 
the centralization of some governmental 
functions on the international plane has 
recently been made in a study by Mr. 
Grenville Clark and Professor Louis 
Sohn. There are others who maintain 
that in the past law has been necessary 
before the State or a government could 
be created. According to this view, we 
must promote the observance of law 
between States before we can hope to 
see any form of international govern-
ment. Perhaps the correct view is that 
government and law, inextricably re-
lated as they are, must march together. 
Having spoken of the origin and 
force of international law, I now must 
turn to some description of interna-
tional law as it exists today, with 
particular emphasis upon the sources of 
international law. There is some criti-
cism, I might add, of the term "inter-
national law" itself, for it is complained 
that the body of law with which we 
must concern ourselves in these days is a 
larger one "which regulates actions or 
events which transcend national fron-
tiers." Professor Jessup, whose descrip-
tion this is, and a number of other 
authorities prefer to employ the term 
"transnational law." Historically, inter-
national law has been said to be that 
body of law which governs the relation-
ships of States. Nevertheless, the impact 
of the law of nations always has been 
felt by individuals. If Nation A owes 
Nation B a duty to protect the latter's 
citizens when they are in the territory 
of State A, the duty may be owed to 
Nation B, but it is the national of State 
B who is protected or injured, as the 
case may be. If one State owes another 
nation a duty not to subject the soldiers 
of the latter to the jurisdiction of its 
courts for line-of-duty offenses in time 
of war, it is the individual soldier or 
sailor who ultimately benefits from that 
immunity. But the International Court 
of Justice as well as many international 
lawyers continue to pay lip service to 
the old view when they say that a State 
bringing a claim against another for an 
injury to its national does so because of 
an injury to its intere~ts, not because of 
the injury to the alien. In our day, when 
international relationships have grown 
more complex and States have to deal 
with other nations, with foreign corpo-
rations, with alien individuals, with 
public international organizations, with 
privatc international organizations (like 
thc Intcrnational Committee of the Red 
Cross or the International Air Transport 
Association), it is probably more correct 
to say that international law governs the 
relationship of a State or public interna-
tional organization with some person or 
body of persons or entity foreign to it. 
The law in this area is still in the process 
of formation. Only a few years ago, the 
International Court of Justice was able 
to conclude that the United Nations had 
international standing to present a claim 
arising out of the death of Count 
Bernadotte, the United Nations Medi-
ator in Palestine. The Court noted that 
the organization was endowed suf-
ficiently with the characteristics of 
international personality that it had 
been able to conclude agreements on 
thc international plane in the past. 
The sources of international law are 
described conveniently for us in Article 
38 of the Statutes of the International 
Court of Justice, which deals with the 
law to be applied by that tribunal. I will 
have a few words to say about each of 
tllese and some related observations 
about where to find the law. The first of 
tllese sources of law is "international 
conventions, whether general or particu-
lar, establishing rules expressly recog-
nized by the contesting states," by 
which is meant treaties to which the 
litigating States are parties. Treaties may 
be bilateral, binding on two States, or 
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multilateral, if three or more States are 
parties. The term "international legisla-
tion" is sometimes used to describe "the 
process and the product of the consci-
ous effort to make addition to, or 
changes in, the law of nations," the 
definition being that of Judge Hudson, 
who has edited a notable collection of 
such treaties. International legislation, 
as thus conceived, must be distinguished 
from the laws adopted by national 
legislatures. It is of the essence of 
national legislation, whether enacted by 
a direct vote, as in a town meeting, or 
through representatives of the people, 
that a properly enacted statute or reso-
lution or ordinance should bind even 
those who were opposed to its adop-
tion. The situation is quite different 
with respect to treaties, for, with rare 
exceptions, they bind only those who 
have consented to become parties to the 
agreement. In this respect, they are 
more like contracts than like statutes. I 
said "with exceptions" because some 
provisions of the United Nations Char-
ter, to take one example, purport to 
govern the conduct of nonmembers of 
the organization. In other instances, 
conventions-a term often applied to 
multilateral treaties-have been drawn 
up which declare that they are declara-
tory of customary international law so 
that we may look to them as evidence 
of the customary law binding on non-
parties to the conventions. A number of 
the defendants in the German war 
crimes trials maintained that since the 
Regulations annexed to Convention No. 
IV of The Hague of 1907 were not in 
force betwcen the parties to the con-
flict, the criminality of their conduct 
could not be adjudged in terms of those 
Regulations. To this contention, the 
tribunals replied that the Hague Regula-
tions and certain provisions of the 
Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 
1929 as well were declaratory of cus-
tomary international law and it there-
fore was possible to look to them as the 
best statement of customary law. 
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In order to determine the meaning of a 
provision of a treaty, it is often necessary 
to have reference to the drafting history 
or travaux preparatoires of the agree-
ment In the case of a multilateral con-
vention, this will include the debates in 
the conference which drafted the treaty, 
the proceedings of the various commis-
sions of the conference, and the reports 
prepared by the commissions and the 
conference. The International Court of 
Justice has shown itself reluctant to rely 
on the drafting history of an agreement in 
order to ascertain its meaning, but it has 
turned to the travaux pre para to ires in 
order to support the conclusion it already 
has reached. 
The second source of international 
law mentioned in Article 38 of the 
Statute of the Court is "international 
custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law." The evidence of inter-
national custom is to be sought primarily 
in S tate practice. It has often been said in 
the past that the conduct of a State 
cannot be creative of law genuinely 
unless it be undertaken because the State 
believed this course of action was the 
proper or obligatory one. I think that it is 
safer to say that State practice, without 
regard to its motives or intent, creates 
customary law, provided it be acquiesced 
in by other nations and is not regarded as 
improper. It is in order to prevent the 
hardening of a country's claims into law 
that other States make protests, as, for 
example, against the claim to a territorial 
sea of 200 miles or to the sudden closing 
of a bay on the asserted grounds that it is 
a historic bay constituting national 
waters of the claimant The claim of 
Norway to a territorial sea of four miles 
drawn from straight base lines wasrecog-
nized by the International Court of 
Justice because of the fact that Norway 
long had asserted its right to those waters 
and other States had acquiesced in this 
claim. It is this translation of practice 
into customary law to which I referred 
earlier when I spoke of the law's search 
for stability through adherence to a 
pattern of conduct established in the 
past. 
We search for evidence of interna-
tional custom in diplomatic history, in 
collections of diplomatic documents, 
and in the writings of scholars who have 
written on these matters. In the case of 
the United States, the great source 
record of our diplomatic history is the 
series Foreign Relations of the United 
States, in which the important diplo-
matic correspondence of this country is 
printed. Publication of this record fol-
lows about fifteen years after the events 
recorded. The practice of the United 
States and of many other countries is 
found more conveniently in Hack-
worth's Digest of International Law, the 
eight volumes of which are one of the 
most important sources for anyone in-
terested in international law. 
The third source mentioned is "the 
general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations." This provision makes 
national legal systems a source of law 
for the creation of international law, 
especially in those cases where there are 
as yet no applicable principles of the 
law of nations. Unjust enrichment and 
respect for acquired rights have been 
said to be two of the principles carried 
over from municipal law-as interna-
tional lawyers confusingly call national 
law-into the law of nations. 
The fourth subparagraph of Article 
38 of the Charter lists two final sources. 
The first of these is "judicial decisions." 
The most important of these are the 
judgments of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, renamed the Inter-
national Court of Justice at the time of 
the adoption of the Charter just to show 
people that the Court had never had 
anything to do with the League. These 
are printed in collections of judgments 
of the Court. The decisions of arbitral 
tribunals also constitute "judicial deci-
sions" for this purpose. The word 
"arbitral" as applied to these courts is 
somewhat misleading, since they render 
their decisions on the basis of law and 
not as an attempted compromise of 
the conflicting demands of the parties 
to the arbitration. There are many 
individual volumes reporting the deci-
sions of various arbitral tribunals. The 
most useful general collection is that 
published by the United Nations, Re-
ports of International Arbitral Awards. 
The opinions of national courts on 
questions of international law also are 
entitled to considerable weight, even 
though in some instances these tribunals 
may be expected to take a somewhat 
more partisan view of the law than 
would an international tribunal. An 
annual volume, bearing the title of the 
International Law Reports, collects 
these decisions of national courts. 
The second of the two "subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of 
law" listed in subparagraph l( d) of 
Article 38 is "the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations," or, more simply, scholarly 
writings. So vast is the amount of treaty 
law, State practice, and judicial deci-
sions that we must rely upon learned 
writers to synthesize this material and 
reduce it to manageable proportions. 
The scholar of the law also fills the 
valuable functions of criticizing the law, 
of attempting to clarify its ambiguities, 
of suggesting the filling of gaps, and of 
charting the progress of the law for the 
future. In this country, the leading text 
is that of the late Charles Cheney Hyde, 
International Law, Chiefly as Inter-
preted and Applied by the United 
States. In Great Britain and throughout 
the Commonwealth, international 
lawyers took to the two volumes of 
Oppenheim, periodically rewritten and 
supplemented by Judge Lauterpacht. 
This rapid survey of the origin and 
application of international law would 
not be complete without some reference 
to the effect given customary interna-
tional law and treaties in the law of the 
United States. I think that it is probably 
safe to say that international law and 
treaties enter into the decision of 
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hundreds of cases in our courts every 
year. International law is part of the law 
of this country and is applied routinely 
in our State and Federal courts. Treaties 
are, under the Constitution, part of the 
"supreme Law of the Land" on an equal 
footing with the Constitution and the 
laws of the United States. It is a 
consequence of the fact that statutes 
and treaties are on the same level that a 
treaty prevails over a prior inconsistent 
treaty, without, of course, impairing the 
binding force of the treaty interna-
tionally. In this latter event, the Con-
gress makes implementation of the 
treaty impossible and thereby causes a 
violation of the treaty by the United 
States. 
If the courts of the United States 
find it easy to give internal effect to 
international law, the position of the 
Executive Branch of our government 
and the Congress as regards the function 
of law in the conduct of foreign affairs 
is in marked contrast. The crucial test of 
the sincerity of a State's devotion to the 
rule of law is whether that State is 
willing to submit its international dis-
putes to the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the International Court of Justice in the 
Hague. The Statute of the Court pro-
vides that individual cases may be re-
ferred specially to the Court or that 
States may recognize the jurisdiction of 
the Court as compulsory. in all legal 
disputes concerning the interpretation 
of a treaty; any question of interna-
tional law; the existence of any fact 
which, if established, would constitute a 
breach of an international obligation; 
and the reparation to be made. The 
United States has accepted the jurisdic-
tion of the Court, but with several 
limitations, the most important of 
which excepts matters within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the United 
States, as determined by the United 
States. If this country does not wish a 
particular case to go to the Court it only 
has to say that the case is one within its 
domestic jurisdiction. It would not be 
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unfair to construe this statement as 
meaning that the United States accepts 
the jurisdiction of the Court except as 
to those cases in which it does not wish 
to accept the jurisdiction of the Court. 
A notable example of the unwillingness 
of the United States to submit its 
disputes to judicial settlement is the 
Interhandel case. The fundamental sub-
stantive issue in that case is whether 
certain property seized by the United 
States during World War II is German, 
and thus enemy property, or Swjss 
property. The Swiss Government main-
tains that the property in question is 
actually Swiss, and that the United 
States is obliged to_ submit the matter to 
arbitration under our treaties with that 
country. Here are two countries with 
similar economic systems, with like de-
votion to the rule of law, with similar 
democratic institutions. There is no 
pitting of the Free World against the 
Communist World here, no great politi-
cal issue, but solely a lawyer's question 
of whether there is an obligation to 
arbitrate and whether the property in 
issue belongs to Swiss or German na-
tionals. It is hard to conceive of a case 
more narrowly legal in nature. And yet 
the United States seems to be unwilling 
to submit even the issue of our obliga-
tion to arbitrate to judicial settlement. 
Our fulminations about the refusal of 
the U.S.S.R. to accept the jurisdiction 
of the Court as to a number of claims 
arising out of destruction of our mili-
tary aircraft seem ludicrous in light of 
our own record as a possible defendant 
before the International Court of Jus-
tice. 
Despite such lapses, I suppose that 
one of the values which we are at-
tempting to defend against the abso-
lutist world is the rule of law in the 
international sphere as well as in our 
various national ones. Our quest for 
legality and order inevitably will suffer 
if we forget how to apply law in our 
relations with our friends, and perhaps 
in our relations with those with whom 
we are less friendly as well. Quite aside 
from this moral commitment which we 
have made, the restraints which interna-
tional law place on our own conduct are 
in our best interests. International rela-
tions are made easier by a system which 
has mapped out where one State's juris-
diction ends and another State's begins. 
In the explosive atmosphere of our 
contemporary world, a spark in the 
wrong place and at the wrong time 
could spell disaster. The person who 
acts inconsistently with law thus may 
do a tremendous disservice to his own 
cause and to' his own country. This 
seems to me to be one of the most 
important single reasons why naval of-
ficers must acquaint themselvcs with the 
body of law which governs the foreign 
relations of their country. The study 
which you will make of international 
law during the coming days should help 
you to identify the danger areas, to 
distinguish the real restraints of the law 
from those which exist only in theory, 
and to understand a problem put in 
legal terms. It is the hope of all of us 
who have come here to share our 
knowledge of international law with 
you that you will come to recognize in 
the law of nations a shield and a sword 
in the battle we wage for an orderly and 
peaceful world. 
----'¥----
